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When an institutioh of culture long taken for 
granted no longer fulfills the purpose for which it was 
instituted, it is no longer taken for granted. Recently 
language has become the subject matter for numerous and 
anxious: disquisitions which question, either wittingly or 
unwittingly, its reliability. Language, whose purpose of 
institution is ostensibly that of conveying thought by means 
of symbols, performs its function so imperfectly that it is 
no longer a trustworthy instrument. This, in brief, provides 
our thesis with its point of departure.^  We should like to ask, 
therefore; why does language in our culture fail to fulfill its 
purpose? And to answer, (since our question begins with ’why1)# 
from the point of view of philosophy#
This paper is written in language; bad language in 
plea for better, as Stuart Chase would say? ^ Not necessarily. 
Hie language, as our thesis proposes to show, depends on how 
valid our plea is. The instrument is ruined by improper use#
1# Cf. infra pp# 16-21, for a differentiation of a philological 
approach and a philosophical approach.
2# Cf. Stuart Chase, The Tyranny of Words (New York; Harcourt 
Brace and Company, 1938) p. 17#
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We have just said that language has become the 
subject matter of numerous and anxious disquisitions. In 
so saying we may have implied that the volume of literature 
devoted to language is a sign of its defection} otherwise 
it would be taken for granted. However, it would be naive 
to argue from these few observations that whenever there is 
an unprecedented concern over the fate of a cultural insti­
tution it is certainly defective. The faet that an unpre­
cedented volume of literature is devoted to language and its 
problems may well be a sign of unprecedented interest in the 
subject. But there is another and morq^rofound explanation 
which accounts for the appearance of so many books on language 
and one which does not necessarily imply that the voluminous 
discussion of it is a sign of its complete failure. This 
explanation shows that it is natural for language to reflect 
upon its own history and its own nature, Clio, too, has 
begun to write her memoirs. We have now 'histories of 
history1,*' as well as histories of men and events. Philosophy 
has also reached the stage in its career where it can reflect 
upon Itself. It is not unreasonable to suppose, then, that 
language could be interested in language, that we can have 
words about words.
1. Cf. James T. Shotwell, A History of History (New Yorks 
Columbia University Press, 1939)"*
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This phase in the development of language, 
because it represents an advancement in the study of 
language, should not be considered as a certain sign of 
its deterioration. Reflection, however, has the unfortunate 
habit of taking its own movement for the first movement 
which it presupposes. We are familiar with this in philo­
sophy and in the tragic part to which epistemology has 
been brought by placing the cartesian cogito (a reflex 
movement of the mind) at the beginning of philosophical 
knowledge, The advance which the study of language has 
gained has been won at the acpense of losing its signifi­
cation, Thus, when language began to use words about 
words, it forgot that words signified thoughts which in 
turn signified things, It remains now for language to 
reestablish its liaison with thought and things. This 
done, it will emerge immeasurably enriched by reflexive 
experience it has had, and will continue to have,-**
1, It is only on condition that we point out that human 
language is possible by virtue of the power of reasoning . 
that we are justified in drawing an analogy between philo­
sophy and language and between their respective histories, 
or for that matter between history and language. That man 
should become conscious of the language he uses is perfectly 
natural. That he should invent a 1 somatic* language to 
talk about language is also reasonable, for whenever there 
is reflexive knowledge new concepts (reflexive) must make 
this known to the mind. Language, no less than any other 
human institution, obeys the progressive law of the human 
mind of which M Mari tain writes: * Cette loi de la pro­
gressive prise de conscience de soi-meme est une des
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This does not alter the fact, however, that 
language in the concrete fails to do what it is supposed 
to do* Descriptions of the plight of contemporary users 
of language abound. Authors like Hayakawa, Korzybski, Lee 
and Chase, to mention only a few of those engaged in trying 
to solve the problem modern language has posed, are aware 
of the difficulties involved in expressing their own 
thoughts, as well as the total effect that the breakdown 
of language has had on contemporary civilization, The 
perfection of so many techniques to facilitate communication, 
from which we expected so much, rather facilitated misunder­
standing among individuals and nations:
As this is being written the world is becoming daily 
a worse madhouse of murder, hatred and destruction.
It would seem that the almost miraculous efficiency 
achieved by modern instruments of communication should 
enable nations to understand each other better and 
co-operate more fully. But, as we know too well, the 
opposite has been the casej the better the communi­
cation, the bloodier the quarrels,
Techniques of communication have been perfected, and science
continues to introduce newer and more efficient means of
grandes lois du developpement historique de l'etre humain, 
et elle se rapporte 4 une propriete des activites d1ordre 
spirituel, Le propre de 1'esprit est de pouvoir, disaient 
les anciens, revenir entierement sur lui-meme, accomplir 
une reflexion parfaite: l'essentiel ici n'etant pas le 
repliement, mais la saisi, la penetration de soi par soi 
qui lui est liee,» Situation de la Poesie (Paris: Desciee 
de Brouwer et Cie, 1938) pp, 79“SO,
1, S. I, Hayakawa, Language in Action (New York: Hareourt, 
Brace and Company, 1941)# 7
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communication. We have in mind here, not only the mechanical 
devices that are instruments of language, but also the tech­
niques within language itself. This latter development, the 
•semantic' approach, to language, reminds us immediately of 
Korzybski, But while the perfection of technique (for Kor­
zybski a panacea'*') facilitates communication, making the world 
smaller, as Professor Perry has so well demonstrated , no 
real improvement is made until what is communicated is improved.
1. Despite what Alfred Korzybski claims: 'I must stress
that I give no panaceas, but experience shows that when the 
methods of general semantics are applied, the results are 
usually beneficial, whether in law, medicine, business, etc,, 
education on all levels, or personal inter-relationships, be 
they in family, national, or international fields.1 .Science 
and Sanity (3rd edition, Lakeville, Connecticut.: The Inter­
national Non-Aristotelian Library Publishing Company, 1948) 
p. v, Korzybski's practical techniques in the field of psy­
chiatry have had some measure of success in World War II (loc, 
cat.), but his general theory of language, which may be 
described as mathematical and pragmatic, falls short of pro­
viding a true explanation of language1 as does any empiricist 
doctrine that takes the effect for the cause, If, as Korzybski 
says, we can lay a great deal of the trouble in the present day 
world at the door of language, it is because language has been 
vitiated by the same empiricism which never can comprehend the 
causes, ('causes', not in his 'non-Aristotelian' sense, but 
causes definitely in the Aristotelian and true sense), and by 
which he proposes to reform language and with it the world,
• 2. Vide Ralph Barton Perry, One World in the Making (New York: 
Current Books Inc., A.A.Wyn, Publishers, 1945)* Professor 
Perry's work gives us an excellent description of what has 
happened to man's spatial' consciousness .in world which has 
■ grown relatively smallerj in effect,. One V/orldp to use Wendell 
-'Willkie's expression, (cf. p. 13).- There are-jp:-according to .
1 Professor Perry, two 'fundamentally different meanings of -. 
'^one‘world’" (loc,cit,). The first- '■onehess' has.been 'brought 
about mainly by scientific and technological ..changes' (ibid,
' p. 13). The second 'oneness' is not yet achieved. It is this
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A point is now easily made: no technique to facili­
tate the means of communication will ever replace the intel­
lectual power necessary to sustain it. As St. Augustine 
taught, knowledge is acquired by proceeding from sense data 
to a knowledge of causes, by progressing from sigh to symbol
to the Truth, It is impossible to terminate a search for
truth in symbols. To make this clearer, let us say that if 
a sign qua sign is itself known without means of another sign 
it is no longer a sign but a thing. three things are required 
for knowledge! one, something to be known; two, a knower, and 
three, the means of effecting a union of the known and the 
knower. If the known is to be known, and not some substitute 
for it, then the means by which the knower is united to the 
known must in itself be unknown directly. This means if the 
concept, which is a pure sign whose essence is to reveal some­
thing other than itself. It is not therefore a representation 
which itself can become an object of knowledge or a working 
equivalent for the thing known.
the Middle Ages viewed the world as a sacramental
second 'oneftess* at which we should aim linguistically, poli­
tically, and so forth, and which, while not guaranteed by the 
unity achieved by science in the field of communication, could 
he.' facilitated by it.
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universe, and its every sign an instrument. The symbols created 
by this era for its own culture reflected the sacramental 
character of the time. Today we have become adept at preser­
ving these symbols, and have retained the liturgy of the 
Middle Ages, at least materially. But the tradition necessary 
to sustain the formal significance of these symbols has been 
broken:
Nous vivons en un temps et dans un milieu satur^s 
d'idees chretiennes qui ne se souviennent plus de leurs 
origines. On procede autour de nous, dans les domaines 
les plus divers, A ce que Gabriel Marcel a si bien 
defini: »une sorte de laicisation indue de notions
religieuses dans leur essence, mais dont le ressort 
vital a ete en quelque sorte prealablement brise,• Des 
notions comme celles de vie interieure, ou de vie 
spirituelle, semblent devenues le bien commun de po&tes, 
d'essayistes ou de philosophes qui, non contents d'en 
faire librement usage, ce qui ne serait rien, pr&tendent 
parfois eh deposseder la pensee chretienne, dont ils 
les ont pourtant empruntees.
This secularization of which M Gilson speaks in no
sense impairs the security of the »sacramental sign' in the
sacramental system, that is, as a means of grace. This sacred
language is beyond deterioration for its indefectibility is
o
guaranteed by its divine institution,*' The secularization
1, Etienne Gilson, Theologie et Histoire de la Spiritualite 
(Paris, J. Vrin,' 1943), pp* 9-10.
2. Not every sign, even for Augustine, is a sacramental sign,
properly speaking: 'Signorum vero alia sunt naturalia, ut
fumus significans ignemj alia data.1 Quoted by Libri IV, 
Sententiorum Peter Lombard (Florence: Typographia Collegii
S. Bonaventurae, 19l£j, from Augustine, loc.cit,. n. 2. To 
this Peter Lombard adds: * e't eonaa quae data sunt, quaedam 
sunt Sacramenta, quaedem non: omne enim Sacramentum est 
signum, sed non e converso,1 (II, p. 746),
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of which M Gilson speaks is, rather, to be found in literature 
and other forms of art that characterize our culture# In 
other words, what culture has sustained, with respect to 
religious symbols, are the secularized forms of sacred symbols 
which have lost their significance, not because religion has 
lost its significance, but because the symbols themselves 
are no longer maintained by the forces that brought them into 
being. Briefly, they have become things to be valued as 
heirlooms, not as instruments of grace.
It is clear then that symbols do not stand by 
themselves. They require minds to interpret them, The 
interpretation which minds give them depends ultimately on 
the intellectual vision of these minds. If the intellectual 
vision is precisely the same as that which made the symbols —  
if, for example, we understand what Chaucer is trying to 
convey to his readers through the instrumentality of the 
language he uses —  we will interpret the symbols correctly,- 
The problem of interpreting symbols, is, however, more 
complex than simply putting oneself in the place of their 
poet. When a tradition intervenes between the original 
signs and their present condition, as inherited from the 
past, it is necessary to interpret them with a mind that 
transcends traditiqn. Language does not provide its own 
intellectual gloss. Living minds must interpret the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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principles within the context of an age,
Everything directly conceived or thought of by our 
intelligence, everything of which we have a concept or 
'mental word1, may be expressed or translated into 
language, But despite the flexibility, the docility, 
the delicacy of any system of language-signs, this 
expression is always more or less deficient in relation 
to thought, The loftiest intellectual knowledge, which 
reveals a world of consequences within a single principle, 
must, so to speak, be scattered and diluted in order to 
be orally expressed,
Indeed it would be absurd to expect material signs, 
uttered one after the other, to duplicate or furnish a 
facsimile of the vital and immanent act of thought. Nor 
is it the purpose of language to furnish such a facsimile 
of thought: its object is to permit the intelligence of 
the hearer to think, by an active repetitive effort, 
what the intelligence of the speaker is thinking, From 
this point of view human language performs its function 
perfectly. Granted the interpretative effort and the 
intellectual activity of the hearep, it is a perfect 
system of signs; suppress this effort and this activity 
and there remains but a radically insufficient system of 
lifeless symbols,
In other words, language not only supposes an effort,., 
on the part of the one who expresses his thought, but also
requires an effort on the part of the listener: a bene­
ficent effort that keeps us from depending entirely on the 
sign and saves us from falling into what Leibnitz called 
'psittacism', a parrot-like use of language,^
The point which Saint Augustine made, naive perhaps to the
moderns, is that signs must signify something. Inevitably
1, Jacques Maritain, An Introduction to Logic (New York:
Sheed and Ward, 1937), pp. 58~59.
2, 'Signum est, quod praeter species, quas ingerit sensui,
aliquid facit in cognitionem venire,' De Doctrina Christiana.
II, c, n,l, J, P. Migne, Patrologia Latina XXXIV, 35. The 
treatment Saint Augustine gives to signs is ostensibly for the 
purpose of elucidating the theology of the Sacraments: ,:Sacra- 
mentum est sacrae rei signum', De Civitate Dei, X, c.s. PL 
41,282, Augustine's definition of sign is not a general 
definition, It designates what the schoolmen would call 'an 
instrumental sign', Cf, John of St, Thomas, 0,P», Cursus 
philosophicus thomisticus. I, Log, II, P.Q. XXI, 1, p, 646 a, 
20-28, (Marietti, Taurini, 1930),
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we must come to an end where signification ceases. God is 
the ultimate designatus in Augustine's thought. Saint 
Augustine's definition of a sign was retained throughout the 
Middle Ages.
In almost every phase of our culture there is 
apparent this concern with signs (or what we may better call 
1sign-things'), with verification which has to do with the 
arrangement of substitutes for things as though they them­
selves were things, and not with what they signify. Verifi­
cation has replaced truth; 'coherence' ^ has replaced logic. 
Mari tain sees this as a contemporary intellectual tendency;
We go to meet reality with a gush of formulas. 
Ceaselessly, we launch prefabricated concepts. At the 
slightest provocation a new concept is formed of which 
we make use in order to take advantage of being, while 
protecting ourselves from it and avoiding having to 
submit to it. We do not try to see, our intelligence 
does not see. We content ourselves with signs, formulae, 
expression of conclusions.•. We take more interest in 
verifying the validity of the signs and symbols we have 
manufactured than in nourishing ourselves with the truth 
they reveal. Has not the word truth itself become 
suspect to many contemporary philosophers? In fact 
our intelligence cares very little for the delights 
and enchantments of the truth, any more than for 
those of being; rather, our intelligence fears both;
1* Cf. Bertrand Russel, Che Problems of Philosophy (London: 
Thornton Butterworth Ltd. , Home University Library Series,
May 1928) pp. 190-193* Cf. supra p. 6. The term 'coherence' 
is particularly apt, for things and words considered as things 
'cohere*.
It is in this sense primarily that we intend the expression 
'verification' to be taken, for ideas are 'verified* in the 
modern sense by testing them as though they were things.
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it stops at the level of verification, just as it stops 
at the symbol.1
There remains the most important reason, however, 
for the philosopher to Jook beyond the sign in his search 
for the truth signified. Philosophy is a search for wisdom. 
This has been so since the days of Thales, when the civili­
zation of Miletos had reached a point in its development 
where it could allow enterprising men to wonder concerning 
what is taken otherwise for granted. Behind the phenomena 
of the world in which men ordinarily are absorbed lies the 
unknown. The realization that there are really two worlds, 
the known and the unknown, caused men to seek the reasons 
of the known in the unknown. Those who penetrated to this 
world of the unknown were counted wise, lovers of wisdom 
or philosophers* This is another way of saying that man 
began to philosophize when his mind confronted mystery, 
for mystery is nothing else than what is known in part aijd 
unknown in part. There is no philosophy without mystery.
Nor is there any poetry.
In his discussion of the comparable activities 
of metaphysics and poetry, M Maritain points out s
One snatches at the spiritual in an idea, by the most 
abstract intellectionj the other glimpses it in the 
flesh, by the point of the sense sharpened by the
1* The Ways of Faith, in ‘The Commonweal*, Vol. LI 4, 
November 4, 1949.
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mind. One enjoys its possession only in the secluded 
retreat of the eternal regions; the other finds it at 
every cross-roads where the singular and the contingent 
meet. Both seek a super-reality, which one attains in 
the nature of things, and the other is content to touch 
in any symbol whatsoever* Metaphysics pursues essences and 
and definitions, poetry every form glittering by the way, 
every reflection of an invisible order. The one isolates 
mystery in order to know it, the other, through the 
harmonies it constructs, handles and makes use of mystery 
like an unknown force.
It is a demonstrable thesis which concludes that with 
a loss of the sense of mystery, the philosophy and the poetry 
of a culture lose their vitality, A case, equally cogent, can 
be worked out for language. When mystery disappears from 
language, it, too, loses its vitality. Language, at least in 
part, reflects common sense. It is for this reason that it 
growns rebellious, so to speak, when it is used to convey 
notions inconsistent with common sense. Inherent in common 
sense, though not made explicit, is the same sense of mystery 
we discover in the great philosophies of the world. Thus in 
those epochs of history, of which our own is the best example, 
when a sense of mystery has all but disappeared, we discover 
common sense in conflict with philosophy and the language of 
common sense in conflict with the technical jargon of philosophy* 
It is, of course, absurd to suggest that philosophy replace its 
technical vocabulary with the vernacular. But it is reasonable 
to propose that philosophy restore the place of mystery, There
I, Art and Scholasticism with Other Essays (London: Sheed and 
Ward, 1947) p# 75*
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is nothing inconsistent in saying that the mystery that gives 
vitality to common sense and expressiveness to its vernacular 
could not also give life to philosophy without sacrificing 
the precision of its vocabulary.
But how should philosophy regain its place by 
recognizing mystery? By reestablishing, we answer, its 
liaison with being, its proper object. It is this being 
of which Aristotle spoke and which he made the object of his 
metaphysics. Any deviation from the pursuit of this object, 
this ens mysterium. is bound to lead to philosophical 
failures and to a contamination of the language which tries 
to express it. History abounds with examples.
Consider, first, the difficulties of language 
raised by Heraclitus, which occasioned the discussion 
recorded in Plato’s Cratylus. The Heracletian Cratylus. 
after whom Plato’s dialogue was named, had to be content 
with a slight gesture of his little finger. Why so? because 
the philosophy of his master could not be coipmunicated,
Parmenides provides us with a second example, Logically he 
could do little more than Cratylus for the reality he tried 
to make philosophically intelligible could be signified by 
one word, and no proposition could be constructed which was 
not a tautology, Plato himself had to resort to myth to des­
cribe his philosophy of nature, for his ideas were inexpressible.
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It is the same for the Middle Ages. The glorious 
achievement of the Middle Ages came to an end when its 
culture lost its sense of mystery, and when what it 
continued to verbalize it no longer took seriously. The 
visible world of the Middle Ages could be signified in its 
symbols so long as that world was seen to b© sustained by 
the Mysterious God Who brought it into being.
It is the same with modem thought. As soon as 
Descartes revised the traditional modes of thought, he had 
to revise the language of philosophy, Kant provides a 
more striking example. He had to create a new vocabulary 
to describe the Newtonian world which he mistook for the 
real world. The technical terms that Kant used are devoid 
of mysterious signification, The world that Newton created 
was necessarily a world in which mystery could have no place, 
a world in which the being of things was inaccessible. This 
was Kant's world. Its philosophy, Etienne Gilson has elected 
to call a 'physicism'But Kant had another world, the
I
world in which men acted, a real world 'but which could be 
reached only in some affective way. Neither of Kant's worlds 
has any intelligible content. What his new vocabulary reflected 
actually was the debility of the modern intelligence,
1* vide E, Gilson, Unity of Philosophical Experience (New 
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937) pp. 223 ff»
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• Poetry has been quicker than philosophy to recognize 
the necessity of returning to mystery and to the source of its 
•vitality:
La podsie est l1expression, par la langage humain 
ramene a son rythae essentiel, du sens mysterieux 
des aspects de 1*existence: elle doue ainsi 
d1authenticity notre sejour et.constitufe la 
seule tache spirituelle.^-
Poetry, in caning to grips with existence, has seen fit to
restore the signification of language by reestablishing its
relation with mystery* (a)
1* Mallarme, *La Vogue* (April IS, 1886), in La Doctrine 
Smboliste, Guy Michaud (Paris, Librarie, 1947).
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CHAPTER II 
The Poetic Disposition of Language
One must not confuse the poetry 
of revolution with a revolution 
in poetry.
Jean Cocteau
Modem poetry, with a courage 
which is sometimes ridiculous, 
has undertaken to scour language,
Jacques Maritain
In this chapter our concern is the influence of 
poetry on language. The usefulness of a discussion of this 
kind does not require elaborate explaining; it is commonly 
accepted that the history of any,nation's language is bound 
up with the history of its poets. In need of explaining, 
perhaps, is the posing of the problems for which this discussion 
tries to provide solutions as philosophical ones.
Generally, the task of tracing words to their original 
uses in the great poetry of a nation is assigned to philology,
The result is a methodical classification of words used in 
poetry and in prose alike. The purpose of such philological 
research is to describe (within the limitations of its techniques) 
a particular language as a means of communication, Its biblio­
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graphical products are, ultimately, word-lists or grammars in 
which are set down the conventional (or 'proper*) meanings and 
usages of the spoken and written words of the language it studies. 
Thus the work begins with an examination of literature, proceeds 
analytically by lifting words out of their contexts,and ends 
with the writing of lexicons and syntactical 'rules*. The cycle 
recommences when those who use lexicons and grammars find them , 
made obsolete by newer and sometimes better modes of expression. 
That this is the case with philological research 
becomes evident when its method assumes the r3le of literary 
criticism. In this instance it appends its analysis to a 
particular work of literature, as if to reconstruct the work 
from the elements it has distilled out of the language in which 
the work is written, So doing, it places the work within the 
entire context of the language. The work thereby becomes a 
special instance of the universal rules which philology 
constructs. Departures from accepted meanings are noted and, 
if sufficiently numerous, can be embraced in wider philological 
generalizations, For this reason the method of philology is 
more readily applied to dead languages than to living^ Here 
the scholar can work more comfortably, since the ground he 
investigates does not shift, He is able to remove a particular 
word, a particular poem or a particular dialect from the total 
corpus of a language whose limits he knows. Philology and
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lexicography, when their concern is with a dead language, have 
the tendency to become coextensive: since there is no longer 
any problem of changing meanings and since the forces respon­
sible for the formation of the language in the first place are 
no longer living, the only task that remains for philology to 
accomplish is a lexicographical one. The case of a living 
language is different. Its limits are unknownj its vocabulary 
is not fixed by a crystalized literature; its stability is 
constantly threatened by obsolescence. Thus the most ambitious 
project to establish fixed meanings of words and their uses is 
bound to fall short of its purpose. It is clear, then, that 
while the philology of living language tends to conserve 
language, it labours always behind a constantly moving frontier. 
Its purpose, it seems,- is being undermined by agencies that 
fail to take cognizance of the fruits of its researches. What 
are these agencies? These agencies, briefly, are represented 
by those who write and speak without the help of dictionaries, 
lexicons and grammars, to wit, those who write poetry and those 
who speak in the vernacular, We do not, we hasten to add, 
exclude scientists who, while they speak a highly technical 
language, are also poets when they try to find new expressions 
not already existing in their technical lexicons. Philology 
does not, cannot, take into account the expansion of language.
It is limited, therefore, to the data provided by non-philo- 
logical sources.
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The publication and use of dictionaries and other
products of philological research are not, however, to be
condemned as practices that typify a decadent culture. They
serve a useful function in facilitating communication among
the living members of a culture and in conserving the symbols
of the past. In a culture as complex as ours philology is,
therefore, an indispensable instrument whose uses must be
maintained to keep what is good in literature and language.
It provides, moreover, a linguistic orthodoxy without which
education would be impossible. In these uses tie discern
simply the practical results of philological research and,
as we have already said, these uses are described from the
1
point of view g>f communication.
But philology also presents us with a knowledge of 
a definite epistemological type, Its methods are positive,.
It draws lines, as it were, between points on a horizontal 
plane. Its object terminates, not in an intellectual 
knowledge of language, but in the senses and the imagination# 
Nevertheless, philology is a science, a science that affirms, 
yet without making the essences it handles explicit, the 
characteristics of words and language within the limits of 
its techniques,^ For this reason philology does not consider
1, Vj_ supra p, 16.
2, Philology belongs to the type of science M Maritain would 
call 'la science de la constatation', as opposed to philosophy 
and mathematics, which he describes as 'la science de l'expli-
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or make intelligible the mysterious forces that bring new 
words and new meanings into being.
cationi: 'II y a des sciences qui portent sur ces essences
comme connues. non pas certes d'une manifere exhaustive, car 
nous ne savons le tout de rien, mais enfin comme connues ou 
manifestoes (par leurs dehors): ce sont les sciences d6duc- 
tives, sciences philosophiques ou sciences math&natiques; 
d^ductives A titre bien different d'ailleurs; car ici, dans 
le savoir mathematique, l1esprit saisit par leurs <§l4ments 
constitutifs et construit ou reconstruit comme de plainpied 
des entit6s qu'il a primitivement tirees du donn£ sensible 
ou qu'il edifie sur celles-la> et qui dans le reel (quand 
ce sont des entia realla). sont des accidents ou propriety 
des corps, mais qu'il traite comme si elles ^talent des 
etres subsistants et comme si la notion qu'il s-'en fait 
6tait libre de toute origine experimentale; la, au contraire, 
dans le savoir philosophique, il saisit des essences substan- 
tielles non par elles-memes, mais par leurs accidents propres, 
et ne proc&de deductivement qu'en se ravitaillant constamment 
dans 1'experience (methode "analytico-synthetique").
Ces sciences~la sont proprement des sciences de 
L1 EXPLICATION... ♦ propter quid est,. selon la terminologie des 
anciens; elles nous revelent les n^cessit^s intelligibles 
immanentes a I'objet, elles nous font connaitre les effets 
par les principes ou raisons d'Stre, par les causes, en 
prenant ce mot au sens tout a fait general que lui donnaient 
les anciens, II peut arriver, il est vrai, qu'affrontant une 
rSalite trop haute et dont 1'essence ne peut Stre connue que 
par analogie, elles doivent se borner (c'est le cas de la 
m^taphysique en face de Dieu) a une connaissance de simple 
certitude de fait (supra-empirique), mais c'est qu'alors . 
elles debouchent pour ainsi dire au deli de 1*explication, et 
il reste que de soi elles demandent & d^couvrir 1'essence,
Et il y a des sciences qui portent sur les'essences 
comme cach&es. sans pouvoir jamais devoiler en elles-m£mes 
les n^cessites intelligibles immanentes a leur objet, ce sont 
les sciences inductives, sciences qui (pour autant du moins 
qu'elles restent purement inductives, ce qui n'est pas le 
cas de la physique et des sciences "experiment ale s'1 des 
modernes,,Bacon et Mill se sont bien tromp^3 lk-dessous) ne 
vont de soi qu'k Stre des sciences de la C0NSTATATI0N 
empirique,* Les DegrSs du Savoir (4th ed,, Paris: Descl^e 
de Brouwer ot Cio, 1946), pp« 65-67,
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Now that we have described the method we wish to 
follow, we are ready to proceed with an examination of the 
use of language in poetry, science, and philosophy,
* * *
•While the practice of poetry need not in itself 
confer wisdom or accumulate knowledge,* T, S, Eliot has 
written, tit ought at least to train the mind in one habit 
of universal value: that of analysing the meanings of words:
of those that one employs oneself, as well as the words of 
others. In times less turbulent than those during which 
these words were written, it would have been scarcely neces­
sary for 12r Eliot to remind his readers that the office of 
poetry is not to be compounded with the office of wisdom. 
Still less would he have been obliged to make explicit 
reference to one of the special benefits that accrues from 
the practice of poetry: sensitivity to verbal signification. 
The essay which this apology initiates may well have been 
dispensed with, for what Mr Eliot has to say may have been 
said more effectively (in happier times) in conversation, as 
he explains in a later essay: "In a society of smaller size
(a society, therefore, which was less feverishly busy) there
1, The Idea of a Christian Society (New York; Harcourt, Brace 
and Company, 1940) p« 4*
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might be more conversation and fewer booksj and we should not 
find this tendency— of which this essay provides one example—  
for those who have acquired some reputation, to write books,, 
outside the subject on which they have made that reputation,1 
The fact remains, however, that Mr Eliot has published his 
notes on problems which theologians, philosophers and sociolo­
gists have discussed and continue to discuss. But where one 
might expect to discover Eliot the theologian, the philosopher 
or the sociologist, one finds only Eliot the poet,2 with 
modesty proportionate to greatness, found only in a poet 
conscious of his mission, he declines the official pespon* 
sibilities that accompany scientific pronouncements, His 
point of departure is, therefore, never a scientific one. It 
can be described by the term fpsychological*, to the extent 
that this much*maligned word describes the nature of the 
extraordinary consciousness always a requisite in a good poet, 
rather than the impersonal doctrine whose truth he witnesses,
1, Notes Towards the Definition of Culture (London: Faber and 
Faber, 1948) p,
2, We do not suggest thereby that Mr,Eliot does not possess 
more than an ordinary understanding of theological and philo­
sophical principles. But he himself claims only what has been 
accorded him as a poet: 'To aim at originality would be an 
impertinence: at most this essay can be only an original 
arrangement of ideas which did not belong to me before and 
which must become the property of whoever can use them,1 
Ibid,, p, v, Cf,1Tradition and the Individual Talent» in 
Selected Essays (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1917) III, 21,
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Thus Mr Eliot, moved by 'the suspicion that the current terms 
in which we discuss international affairs and political theory 
may only tend to conceal from us the real issues of contem­
porary civilization'***, is prepared to take his post among 
those 'guardians of the vast armoury of language', to use 
Coleridge's phrase,** The justification for broaching subjects 
alien to the work of poetry clearly,lies in the extraordinary 
fact of being an extraordinary poet, With this we should not 
quarrel,.. In Mr Eliot we have a first class witness who describes,, 
in terms of experience what we intend to describe philosophically. 
Behold, then, the poet* He is, as the word itself 
declares, a maker, a maker of language, a craftsman in words,
A poet knows words as a sculptor knows marble, as a musician 
knows sound, or as a physician knows medicine* His knowledge 
of language is the sort acquired by a practitioner, belonging, 
as Aristotle would say, to the order of praxis, The poet 
comes to this knowledge, of the kind he can justly claim to 
have of words, by pleasing himself with regard to the manner 
in which he uses them, But how does the poet so please 
himself?
1,. The Idea of a Christian Society, p, v,
2, Miscellanies. Aesthetic and Literary (London: G, Bell and 
Sons Ltd,, ed. T, Ashe, 1911) p. 143.
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We answer simply by saying that the poet's pleasure 
is derived by making a poem out of words, ' That is, the poet 
pleases himself by making something, not in haphazard fashion, 
but in accord with the rules of his art,^ It is thus the poet 
establishes a liaison,with the mysterious being which makes 
the poem intelligible. In making the poem intelligible he 
gives it a form, a substantial form, which may be likened to 
the human soul. This substantial form is what Raiss# Mari tain 
calls le sens pofrbique as opposed to le sens logique.
Le sens logique ou rationnel n'est pas exigible en 
poesie pour lui-meme, il semble meme extrinseque a la 
poesie comme telle, Et cependant, d'une manibre ou 
d'une autre, a un degre quelconque, il accompagne 
toujours 1'oeuvre poetique: ou bien d'une faqon explicite, 
ou bien eij faisant implicitement appel au concours de 
1'intelligence, Faute de quoi la poesie elle-meme 
disparait, Voila le paradoxe que nous voudrions 
consid^rer.
Le sens poetique se confond avec la poesie elle~ 
meme. Si j'emploie ici 1'expression sens poetique 
plutot que le mot poesie, c'est pour marquer que la 
poesie fait etre le pofeme, comme l'ame fait Stre le 
corps, en etant la forme (en langage aristot^licien) 
ou l'idse (en langage spinoziste) de ce corps, en lui 
donnant une signification substantielle, un sens 
ontologique.
It is for this reason that the intelligibility of the poem 
and hence the meanings of the words which compose it cannot 
be discovered by any analysis which resolves it into its
1, vide Jacques Maritain, Art et Scholastique (Paris: La 
Librairie de l'Art Catholique, 194&) pp. 57 72,
2, Situation de la Poesie (Paris: Descl^e de Brouwer et 
Cie, 1938)' pp." 13-14.
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component parts if each part is considered as a word with 
a standard or logical meaning,
What transformation does language undergo when 
it becomes the language of a poem? First, the being of 
the language is improvedj it becomes informed by virtue 
of being disposed. It receives, in the language of the 
Platonists, a splendor veri. the splendor ordinls. as St, 
Augustine says, and the splendor formae. as St. Thomas 
says,1 It is because the intelligence loves beauty, form 
and truth that it makes the language conform to itself in,, 
the intuitive vision which the poet expresses in the poem. 
Second, the poet makes use of language but in so doing 
creates a speech, In this connection the differentiation 
alluded to by L, H, Gray is particularly useful,^ There 
are three separate aspects of language conveyed by the 
words language, tongue and speech. But better rendered 
by the French: langage, langue and parole, which designate 
respectively language in its universal, its social, and its 
individual aspects,
Therefore the poet makes use of a langue to create 
a parole. When this is accomplished the poet should be 
pleased, *If a writer wishes to give the effect of speech
1, Cf. Jacques Maritain, Art et Scholastique (Paris: La 
Librairie de l ’Art Catholique, 1948) p. 37.
2, Louis H, Gray, Foundations of Language (New York: 
Macmillan, 1939) p. 18.
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he must positively give the effect of himself talking in
his own person or in one of his r o l e s . T h i s  is what
happens in the great moments of the history of our language
when a Chaucer is born. It is not inconceivable that in
creating a speech or parole that a poet please only himself
by speaking in a language clear only to himself^ not to
others, James Joyce provides us with an example: 'En
realite, 1*auteur1 (Joyce) '6crit dans une langue £trangbre
2
connue de lui seul, mais bien connue de lui,*
Yet it is not necessary that the poet change the 
language from its grammatical and orthographical form in 
order to transfigure language. In fact, the poet can derive 
his vocabulary from the commonest speech. What Theodore 
Haecker has written of Virgil's talent to transform, much 
to the sorrow of translators, the words of daily social . 
intercourse into poetry, illustrates precisely what we 
mean here: 'The rock on which translators come to grief 
lies in this inexorable law of classic art: out of the 
commonest words must be fashioned the most uncommon line; 
soiled and jaded words must be lifted up into the glory of 
the pure w o r d , T h i s  freshness which comes in the
1, T, S, Eliot, 'Rhetoric and Poetic Drama', in Selected 
Essays (London: Faber and Faber Ltd,, 1919) p, 38,
2, Raissa Maritain, Situation de la Poesie (Paris: Descl^e 
de Brouwer et Cie, 1938) "p, 31
3* Virgil (London: Sheed and Ward, 1937) p, 24.
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making of language is sometimes discovered and not made 
by the poet, but far the same reasons.
That upon which one in vain has sought enlighten­
ment from books is suddenly illuminated by a flash of 
light at hearing one serving-maid conversing with 
another} an expression which one has tried in vain to 
torture out of one*s own brain, in vain has sought in 
dictionaries, even in the ‘Dictionary of the Society 
of the Sciences** this one hears in passing —  a raw 
soldier utters it, and does not dream what a rich man 
he is,
Por the same reasons it is understandable why 
a revolution in poetry brings with it all sorts of 
obscurity.--obscurities which result from,!he matter of 
the poem and not its substantial form; *.,, the material 
of art is never quite the same1, says T, S, Eliot, Thus 
when new matter is informed even by the same old ideas, 
it is the matter which gives rise to the obscurities,
It is only after the matter has become familiar that 
these obscurities are removed. But the process of 
familiarization begins when the poet publishes his poem, 
when the poet‘s idiom becomes either part of the language 
in which he writes or part of a new language which he 
creates; and when, in effect, he surrenders himself to 
the common intelligibility which his poetry, now 
depersonalized, is bound to assume,
1, S. Kierkegaard, Stages on Life*s Way (Pr'nceton: Princeton 
University Press, Trans, Walter Lowrie,1940) p, 440,
2, Selected Essays (London: Faber and Faber Ltd,,.1917) P« 16,
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The use of unfamiliar matter to force a revolution 
may involve another language, as when an English poet makes 
use of French wordsj it may involve the use of archaicisms, 
as when meanings latent in language are once more revived) 
or it may involve the use of argot or slang. The need for 
new and unfamiliar matter is always present, not only for 
poets, but for artists of all kinds. The cubists in 
modern art are good examples: they needed new building 
blocks, so to speak. The constantly shifting ground on 
which the poet builds his verbal edifices should not, 
however, discourage poetry. It is imperative, in fact, 
that the poet keep on the move, ready always to endow the 
mercuric medium in which he works with a flash of the eternal 
light his soul reflects. If the soul of the poet is 
reflected in the work of the poem,, the words must be indeed 
somewhat obscure. Every human soul is an unrepeatable 
mystery, never completely comprehended, not even by its 
possessor. Obscurity, then, should be welcomed if, in 
hiding the hackneyed and the common uses which wear language 
out, it reveals the mysterious order of the poet’s soul.
The process which Mr Eliot has called •depersonal- 
ization' does not prevent an increasing revitalization of 
language by poetry, ’Depersonalization' is of two kinds: the 
one 'creative’, the other 'corruptive'. When a word becomes
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purely a convention of communication and nothing more, its de­
personalization is 'corruptive'. The word 'nice' is sufficient 
as an example: pleasing everyone, it pleases no one. In 'creative 
depersonalization' where life is given to a word without pre­
cluding its general use, it pleases everyone, by pleasing someone, 
the poetj and no less so if, in entering the language, it must 
suffer the pangs of obscurity. Thus the words of poetry 
('reverse' signs) signify at once objects and a subject, the 
poet. By making a word signify what is in his own soul the poet 
accomplishes his revolution of language. Here we can understand 
the affinities between poetry and experimental science. The 
poet wishes to signify an order higher than that discovered by 
his senses, by improving what he discovers, by remedying the 
deficiency of sense knowledge. But he does not accomplish this 
revolution by destroying what he discovers. The final effect 
is achieved when the order which sensible, concrete things have 
in the poet's imagination (in his soul), is reflected by the 
disposition of the words of his poetry. The subject is revealed 
first, the object after, In science, on the contrary, it is the 
object which is revealed first by 'direct' signs.
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CHAPTER III
The Influence of Science on Language
In this chapter we study the effect of science on 
verbal signification. The way in which we propose to do 
this is to examine various mythological literatvires that 
result from an inability of science to reach the mysterious 
realm of existence. Modern scientistic mythology, it is 
our belief, has arisen from the disintellectualization of 
philosophy cqt off from reality and existence by empiricism 
and idealism. The language that this mythology has created 
is a language of fictions which have meaning only in the 
arena of action.
There are three positions that merit our attention 
in this connection. The first position is that of Professor 
Cornford; of special interest here is his interpretation of 
Plato's Timaeus, The second is that of Hans Vaihinger's 
philosophy of 'As If*. And finally Jacques Maritain's thought 
on the purpose of Plato's mythology will be reviewed.
With the exception of M Maritain's position, which 
transcends the other two, we discover analogies of myth as a 
fictitious ideal. The purpose of reviewing these positions 
becomes clear when we consider the emphasis that contemporaries
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place on attitudes. The effect on language has been tremendous. 
Words no longer signify an intelligible content, but a feeling, 
Language has its own modern mythology replete with meaningless 
symbols which evoke little thought but which can, nevertheless, 
serve as powerful instruments in firing men to action. It is 
almost true to say that a . greater part of the modem vocabulary 
is a lexicon of attitudes.
We should first point out that the three positions Vfe 
have chosen are not to be taken strictly as historical stadia. 
Rather they exhibit in a remarkable way the role that meta­
physical thought plays in the drama of language, Cornford 
and Vaihinger have no metaphysics in the true sense of the 
word. For this reason they fall back upon erroneous expla­
nations which betray the common source of their misconceptions, 
M Maritain, on the other hand, sees quite clearly what is 
wrong with the modem world, precisely because the centre 
of his philosophy is metaphysical. The conclusion which we 
here anticipate is that contemporary language is a language 
of fictitious meanings because the moderns have attempted 
to replace metaphysics with a disintellectualized empiricism. 
Words have nothing to signify except what relates to the 
practical order. Let us then consider first the teaching of 
Professor Cornford,
Here it is a question of defining the Timaeus of
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Plato. Is it an exposition of the truth? Is it fancy? We
let Professor Cornford. answer:
The Timaeus is a poem, no less than the De rerum natura 
of Lucretius, and indeed more so in certain respects. 
Both poets are concerned, in the first instance, with 
our practical attitude towards the world —  what we 
should make of our,life there and how to face the 
prospect of death,
* Ostensibly Professor Cornford1s answer here 
embodies a moral purpose. But such a purpose cannot be 
based on literal truth* Hence the mythological character . 
of the Timaeus:
There are two senses in which the Timaeus is a 
•myth* or •story* (Mythos)... no account of the 
material world can ever amount to an exact and self- 
consistent statement of unchangeable truth. In the,, 
second place the cosmology is cast in the form of a 
cosmogony, a 'story1 of events spread out in time.,. 
Such a story was, to Plato, very far from being like 
the truth.
Let us understand Professor Cornford aright. It 
is impossible, he seems to say, to represent a changing 
world in any other fashion than by a form of literature 
which is itself spread out in time. In this light the 
Timaeus is a reconstruction of sensible reality (or should 
we say unreality?) which cannot be represented literally. 
Thus then philosophical analysis fails, myth succeeds, and 
for the same reason, the Timaeus can be no more than a 
•likely' story:
lf P. M, Cornford, Plato's Cosmology (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul Limited, 1948) p, 31.
2, loc.cit.
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.,,the important point is that no matter whether you 
prefer to analyze the world or to construct it piece 
by piece, the account can never be more than ‘likely*, 
because of the changing nature of its objectj it can 
never be revised and amended into exact truth,
Professor Cornford adds to this, and quite rightly, that any
interpretation of the Timaeus that considers it an allegory
is incorrect. Though the myth of the Timaeus is a ‘likely*
story, it is not to be confused with the plausibility of
modern scientific approximations. Yet his explanation was
as good as that of Democritus;
The cosmology of the Timaeus is poetry, an image that 
may come nearer to conveying truth than some other 
cosmologies. But the truth to which it Can approximate 
is not an exact and literal statement of ‘physical laws*, 
such as modern science dreams ofj it is the truth, 
firmly believed by Plato, that the world is not solely 
the outcome of blind chance or necessity, but shows 
the working of a divine intelligence, Plato would 
have claimed that, considered as an explanation of 
sensible appearances, his own theory of the simple 
primary bodies and their transformations was quite 
as plausible as the atomic theory of Democritus, He 
would also have claimed that it was a better explanation 
and nearer to the truth in that it attributes to intel­
ligible design much that Democritus left to mere chance. 
This nearness to truth has nothing to do with the 
modern notion of ‘approximation1 indicated, for example, 
in the following passage: 'The accuracy of the obser­
vations is dependent on the limits to the discriminative 
fineness of our senses, and on the delicacy of our 
"instruments of precision"*,, When all possible 
precautions have been taken, the measurements of 
physical magnitudes are necessarily approximate and 
would remain so even if we had not to allow fop the 
possible modifications of every hypothesis in natural 
science by the discovery of new "appearances'".
1, loc, cit,
2* loc, cit, (Cornford quotes Taylor here: loc, cit. n,4).
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If we interpret Cornford correctly on this point, 
we are left with the conclusion that Plato possessed a 
metaphysics in which he idealized plans for action and a 
poetic in which he expresses these ideals, On the same 
subject perhaps more interesting is Hans Vaihinger's 
philosophy »As If*.
Fundamentally his thought resembles Cornford's 
ideas, Like Cornford, he regards Plato's myths as pure 
fictions .•’•And like Cornford, ho evinces the same Kantian 
tendency to suppose only two limited worlds, the world of 
science and the world in which we act, Having denied the 
means of access to a knowledge of the world of things, he 
regards truth as an impossible attainment. The only 
alternative is to regard all hypothesis, abstractions, 
categories, and so forth, traditionally held to be 
instruments by which the reality of things was grasped, 
as fictions, Conceptual knowledge, ideational constructs 
and all such moans and logical instruments are* consequently, 
to be abandoned. The beginnings of a theory of fictions, 
so construed, can be discerned in the history of Greek 
philosophy}
Before there could be a logical theory of fictions, 
they had first to be created and employed in scientific
yide Hans Vaihinger, The Philosophy of »As If* (London: 
Boutledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1949), pp. 26, 140,
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practice —  for if there is any Held where theory 
does not precede practice, it is here. The scanty 
beginnings of a practical employment of the fiction 
in ancient times hardly sufficed for the creation 
of a theory, and had anyone in those days really 
been struck by the peculiar characters of the fiction, 
he would certainly have at once confused it with an 
ordinary assumption or hypothesis. The view that we 
can and must think, without thereby necessarily 
implying anything as to the nature of existence, and 
yet be able to attain correct practical results, was 
one to which the ancients never attained. That we are 
compelled to think of something was always regarded as 
a proof of the reality of what was thought of. That 
what we are (apparently) compelled to think of, is not 
objective but can only be a means —  such an idea is 
an entirely modern product,-*-
It would be possible to disagree with Vaihinger's inter­
pretation of Greek philosophy in this passage on the ground 
that he fails to consider the nature of judgment as affirming 
essences of existents, which would explain how conceptual 
knowledge is completed in an existential judgment. However, 
more urgent is the necessity of demonstrating exactly what 
Vaihinger means here.
First, it is clear enough what he means by 
1 scientific practice1 if, as he intends, the expression 
is used in its modem sense. He refers principally to a type 
of verification. 'Scientific practice' is the ground on which 
certain theories are put to pasture. The validity of the 
practice could not, of course, be a priori determined until this 
verlficatory or testing period were in some sense completed.
1. ibid.. pp. 139-140.
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Patently, and this is our second point, lacking in 
Vaihinger's philosophy is a metaphysics and a philosophy 
of nature which would provide him with a true centre for 
moral theory, and not a fictitious one, for action; if he 
possessed this, he would not have interpreted Plato’s 
Mythology as a necessary poetic which accompanies a 
philosophy unable to express the sensible real, in which 
action takes place.
Before considering Maritain’s position, let us 
dwell on Plato himself. The philosophy of Plato, as it 
appeared in The Republic, was built on the theory that 
somewhere there exist archetypes of all the qualities of 
the sensible universe. These archetypes are concepts or 
ideas, and are the only objects which satisfy the require­
ments of science. These ideas exist in things by partici­
pation. The things themselves, since they are not ideas, are 
not reality; they belong to the realm of pure becoming (as 
Heraclitus had taught), and are the objects of imagination and 
opinion. Mathematics provides the prototype of the science 
which in a sort of Pythagorean excursus lifts the mind from a 
consideration of sensible things to a contemplation of 
intelligible necessities:
...arithmetic has a very great and elevating effect, 
compelling the soul to reason about abstract number, 
and rebelling against the introduction of visible or 
tangible objects into the argument,,.this knowledge
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may be truly called necessary, necessitating as it 
clearly does the use of the pure intelligence in 
the attainment of pure truth... Knowledge is the 
real object of the whole science.,.the knowledge 
at which geometry aims is knowledge of the eternal> 
and not of aught perishing and transient,..geometry 
will draw the soul towards truth, and create the 
spirit of philosophy,1
But still Plato lacked a medium of communication, 
Mythology enabled him to speak of the physical world even 
though it is not an object of knowledge. He developed 
mythology to such perfection that had to resort to an 
explanation of the most abstract problems by means of 
these analogies. The finest literary example of this 
is found in his analogy of the cave, in which man is 
described as a captive in a cave, seeing only the shadows 
cast on the wall before him of the living things which 
move behind him in the sunlight of the intelligible 
world. He concludes this analogy thus:
But the release of the prisoners from chains, 
and their translation from the shadows to the images 
and to the light, and the ascent from the underground 
den to the sun, while in his presence they are vainly 
trying to look on animals and plants and the light 
of the sun, but are able to perceive even with their 
weak eyes the images in the water (which are divine), 
and are the shadows of true existence (not shadows of 
images cast by a light of fire, which compared with 
the sun is only an image)— this power of elevating ■ 
the highest principle in the soul to the contemplation 
of that which is best in existence, with which we may 
compare the raising of that faculty which is the very
The Republic (New York: The Modern Library, Trans, by 
B, Jowett, 1945) VII, 525-527.
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light of the body to the sight of that which is 
brightest in the material and visible world —  this 
power is given, as I was saying, by all that study 
and pursuit of the arts [of mathematics]] which has 
been described.
The expression of metaphysical principles by 
means of mythology was not restricted to Plato alone.
We find in the rituals of contemporary primitives a 
complete philosophy of life based on the explanatory 
principle of legend and myth, The powerful influence in 
tribal life of such ritualistic customs as black,.magic, 
totems, and voodoo, is difficult to overestimate,
Jacques Maritain, in his discussion of the symbolic rites 
of primitive^, explains it so:
,,.in order to re-endow things with the 
efficacity of an Archtypal-sign, which is their 
origin and from which they derive and in which 
they participate, the pseudo“Platonism of primitive 
man accounts for them, not by a supra-temporal Idea, 
but by a story (which reverts to a pre-temporal 
event). It has been said that the etiological myth 
.justifies things, it Validates1 them. Already, in 
a nocturnal fashion, it assigns to them a 'cause' —  
however different that cause may be from the 'causes' 
of our science. Already it corresponds to a seeking 
after knowledge, to a magical rough sketch of know­
ledge, But all this while making manifest its 
practical origin and its dependence with regard to 
the practical sign,^
Among civilized moderns, myths still hold an 
unconquerable realm. Though centuries have passed since
1* loc, cit, p, 532,
2, Ransoming the Time (New York: Charles Scribner1s Sons, 
1941) p. 247.
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the philosophy of Plato was established, man still clings
to Platonist mythology to help him in his explanation of
what should be explained abstractly. Climaxing his search
for truth in the signs expressing it, and becoming ensnared
in a mesh of the symbols of modem mythology, the searcher
finds the result as confusing and futile as the mathematician1!?.
attempt to elucidate the tternal verities with numbers.
Numerology is a kind of mythology. Perhaps the best example
in our own culture is the myth of necessary progress. This
myth, as others that rob time-honoured words (like ’science*,
‘democracy*, ’history*) of their treasured meanings, has no
meaning in the sense that it expresses no truth. The genesis
of this myth among the moderns is interesting to trace:
...the very idea of necessary and universal progress 
is, strictly speaking, not an idea at all. It is 
not a concept whose purpose is to furnish the 
intellect with a hold upon the real, and therefore 
the intellect cannot measure or rectify it. On the 
contrary it is one of those merely verbal formulas —  
which are more perfect in their order in proportion 
as they are more independent of, and remote from, 
and arbitrarily imposed upon, things. If you would 
understand their origin, go back to the Cartesian 
clear idea. From the clear idea pass on to the 
facile idea —  facile in that it allows of the very 
widest application, and explains the greatest number 
of things with the least effort —  effort of thought 
particularly. From that you pass easily to the 
idea-feeling which, applied to things without taking 
account of their distinctive natures and enfolding 
within its wide sympathy all field§6f thought, 
connotes no more than an effective state or a prac­
tical attitude of the thinking subject. And now at
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last, at a third remove from the clear idea, you 
arrive at what I can only call the idea-myth which, 
emptied of all intelligible content and having no 
other end save to stimulate in the imagination and 
the appetite certain well-recognised and pleasurable 
reactions, dominates despotically the whole field of 
representation and the individual himself, whom it 
sets a-quiver the moment it is put before his mind. 
Thus have come to birth those ideological divinities, 
those pseudo-ideas wherein the real is altogether 
swallowed up, which in their totality constitute 
modem mythology.
This passage brings us to the heart of the 
problem created by contemporary scientistic mythology.
The 'idea-feeling* of which M Maritain speaks has a 
verbal correspondent. If ideas are emptied of signifi­
cation so also are the words that signify them, It is 
this loss of the ontological content of ideas that is 
responsible for the disintellectualization of language. 
This is the principle which makes M Maritain's explanation 
of Platonic mythology correct and the explanations of 
Vaihinger and of Cornford false. To substantiate these 
observations let us examine M Maritain's interpretation 
of Plato's myths# To understand his position it is
1j, Jacques Maritain, Theonas (London: Sheed and Ward, 1933) 
pp. 108-109. Cf. C. K. Ogden, Bentham's Theory of Fictions. 
(London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., Ltd., 1932) 
quoting Bentham's Works. Vol. Ill, pp. 593-59k ): 1 *Give us 
our rights, say the thousands and the millions. Give us 
our rights, they say, and they do well to say so. Yet, of 
all who say so, not one perhaps can say, not one perhaps 
ever conceived clearly, what it is he thus calls for —  
what sort of a thing a right is.'
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necessary, first, to point out that he judges Plato's
philosophy of nature in the light of his metaphysios,
Plato's metaphysics he designates as une metaphysique
de 1'extra reel.1 In other words, the objects of
knowledge on which metaphysics bears are existentially
separate from things. The scientific prototype of
Platonic metaphysics is in this respect mathematical:
Metaphysique extra-reelle qui est, en somme, concue 
par Pin ton a 1*image des mathematique, La geometrie 
constitue, elle aussi, une monde extra-r^el, et 
tout philosophe qui commence par la geometrie, qui 
inscrit a sa porte la devise platonicienne, sera 
tente inevitablement de concevoir ainsi la m&ta- 
physique sur le type des mathematique et de colloquer 
les objets du metaphysicien dans un monde separ6.
This understood it is easy to see how it is impossible
to conceive of a philosophy of nature. Nature constitutes
the sensible, imitable, contingent reality of things.
But philosophy bears upon a world of changeless essences
entirely separated from things. There can be, therefore,
no philosophy of nature for Plato, What is known of
nature is necessarily consigned to the category of
opinion,(doxa)^
...il n'y a pas, il ne peut pas y avoir de philosophie 
de la nature dans un systeme comme celui de Platon. 
D'un cote, vous avez la doxa, 1'opinion, qui concerne
1. Jacques Maritain, La Philosophie de la Nature (Paris: 
Chez Pierre f^qui, 1948) "p. 3.
2. loc, cit.
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Xe monde sensible et son devenir, de 1'autre vous 
avez le monde des archetypes dternels, objet de 
la metaphysique. Vous avez dlun cot! 1* opinion 
port ant sur le monde du devenir et puis, en tant 
que science, vous avez le s mathematiques et la 
metaphysique, pas de connaissance scientifique de 
la nature, pas de connaissaince scientifique du 
monde du mouvement et du temps. C'est pourquoi 
lorsque le philo sophe cherchera malgrd tout k 
dormer une interprdtaticn de ce monde, et a 
s'elever au-dessus de 1'opinion commune, de 
llopinion vulgaire, il ne pourra proceder qu'a 
l1aide de mythes. L1usage de mythes pour 
interpreter la nature sensible est reellement 
indispensable dans la philosophie de Platon.
D’une raaniere generale, je crois qu'on peut dire 
que le recours k des mythes explieatifs est rendu 
neeessaire par toute tentative d'expliquer les 
phenomenas de la nature a 1>aide uniquemtat du 
savoir mathematique. *
From the above text, it should be manifest to the 
reader that a mathematicised science which lacks a 
philosophy of nature, a philosophy making motion 
and change intelligible, necessitates a poetic 
explanation of nature. Poetry (now no longer 
defined as the ’divination of the spiritual in the 
things of sense' has been saddled with the task 
of description, a task for which it was not originally 
intended, and for which it is ill adapted*
1* ibid. pp. 6-7•
2* Jacques Maritain, ’The Frontiers of Poetry1, in 
Art and Scholasticism with Other Essays (London: Sheed 
and Ward, 1947) p. 75.
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The mistake, then, is not linguistic. Language 
has n6t deserted man; man has deserted language. Nor 
is it a scientific error. It is understandable that 
science must create a language with specialized 
syntax and grammar to express the relations it knows.
It is, rather, an intellectual error. If, in fact, 
there has arisen a scientistic mythology which invests 
words once conveying deeper meanings with ’scientific1 
meanings, Sho, kb may ask, are responsible? The only 
plausible answer is: the 'philosophers’. From Descartes 
to Kant we discern the first phase in the dilution of 
verbal meanings. It is an easy matter to trace, as 
M. Maritain has done, the transition from idea to idea- 
feeling, from Descartes' Discourse on Method to Kant's 
Critiques, from a mathematicization of language'*' to a 
frantic and futile attempt to restore its meanings
1. Cf. Peter Wust, 'Crisis in the West', Essays in Order 
# 10, (New York: Sheed and War, 1940) p. 117. ‘The insist 
tence of science that perception shouod be as much dehuman­
ized as possible was,..properly speaking, an aspiration 
towards an utterly despiritualized reality, which was to 
present only an absolutely calculable mechanism. The 
beginning of this tendency is already typified by Descartes' 
discovery of analytic geometry. However important in the 
abstract this discovery may have been for mathematics, it 
became, so to speak, the prototype of the relativity mania 
which characterizes modem science. Just as in the first 
case the mathematical forms were reduced to their numerical 
ratios, so the whole domain of forms proper to being was to 
be resolved into similar relative values. It is hardly to 
be wondered at, then, if gradually space and time became
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in the world of action by making it affective and from Kant'*'
to the proponents of 'value theories' in whom the cycle is
2completed. We have, therefore, on the one hand laws , 
theories, hypothesis, and so forth, and, on the other, the 
world of values or the world of action. Two vocabularies 
are needed for each world. And in fact we do have two 
vocabularies, the one the physico-mathematical vocabulary 
of science, and the other the vocabulary of mythology. 
Neither of these vocabularies is sufficient, for neither 
is metaphysical, nor for that matter 'physical' (in the 
ancient sense). Since the language in which we speak of 
nature is mathematicized, only motionless essences are 
grasped. But nature changes, is in a constant state of
the sole great irreducible factors of existence, the over­
coming of which human thought set before itself as its 
almost exclusive aim,'
And so with language: The ideal to which' contem­
porary semanticists aspire is, in the last resort, a 
language completely mathematicised.
1, R, A. Wilson, The Miraculous Birth of Language (New York: 
The Philosophical Library, 1948) p* 53. 'When Kant in his 
investigation of the nature and validity of human knowledge
in the Critique of Pure Reason (17$l) undertook an examination 
of space and time as the starting point in the discussion, he 
struck the path which ail fruitful philosophical investiga­
tion has followed since,' And it is thus that Professor 
Wilson wishes to investigate language and so add to the long 
list of unphilosophical treatises that have since been 
written on other subjects, a time-space account of language. 
(cf‘ ibid. PP* 54-55).
2, Which Vaihinger defines as 'the summation of constant 
relations where the chance variations and apparent irregu­
larities in detail are disregarded', (ibid. p. 215).
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change. Nor is it possible for a mathematicised language 
to describe •goods*, necessary for moral action, *In 
mathematicis non est bonum', the ancients used to say. It 
is for this reason we should retain the term 'value1 to 
designate what the moderns mean by incentives for action 
which have no foundation in the intellectual order but merely 
in the space-time world of Kant wherein there is no morality. 
Actually Hans Vaihinger's errors are more instructive than 
they might first appear, A 'summational fiction', he would 
say, is 'in theory a comparatively worthless construct'."*"
It is worthless because no plausible conduct can be based 
on it. This is quite true, if,the theory is 'scientific' in 
the physico-mathematical sense. What Professor Vaihinger 
unwittingly demonstrates in his Philosophy of 'As If' is 
M Maritain's thesis that without a true metaphysics, there 
is no philosophy of nature and that without a philosophy 
of nature there is only mythology.
We need only to add that the language of science is 
not a universal Instrument, It conveys only what it should 
convey. Should we try to make it convey more we are left 
with Professor'Vaihinger's world of 'summational fictions', 
a veritable wasteland of meaningless symbols.
1, loc, cit.




Mme Maritain provides us with the important
distinction which begins our conclusion:
C1est la ce qui distingue tout d'abord le poeme de 
toute oeuvre de mode prosaique, je ne dis pas de 
toute prose, Dans le mode prosaique, en effet, les 
mots ne sont presque exclusivement que des signesi 
ils sont 111, avant tout, pour referer I1 esprit k ce 
qu*ils signifient; eux-memes, ils ont une importance 
secondaire. Tandis qu'en poisie les mots sont h la 
fois des signes et des ob.jets (des objets porteurs 
d*images) qui s'organisent en un corps vivant et 
independantj Ils ne peuvent ceder la place a un 
synonyme sans que souffre ou meure le sens du poeme 
comme tel.
On the one hand, we have then words which comprise the 
constituitive parts of a work of art, viz., a poem.
On the other, we have words whose primary purpose is to 
point to something beyond themselves. It goes without 
saying that the words used in one case can be identical
materialiter to those used in the other. There is no
reason, therefore, to prevent our saying that the same
dictionary could list all the words used in a given poem
and in a given scientific treatise. But it is important 
to point out that the meanings of the words in the
1. ibid.. p, 15,
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scientific treatise would be close to the meanings found in 
the dictionary. This we have alrtady proved in Chapter II, 
when we demonstrated that a philological description of 
language that ends with the work of the lexicographer is not , 
sufficient to account for the creative influx of new meanings. 
Every new poem proposes a new set of meanings. As we have 
indicated in Chapter II. the source of these meanings can be 
found in the unique experience of the root; that is, where the 
language is poetic. This experience is spiritual:
La source de la poesie et de toute intuition 
creatrice est dans une certaine experience qu'on peut 
appeler *connaissance' obscure et savoureuse, d'une 
saveur toute spirituelle, car a ces profondeurs tout 
est esprit et vie, et toute poete sait qu'il y p6netre 
par un recueillement de tous ses sens, si fugitif 
soit-il, condition premiere de la conception poetique.
It is evident then that the term of this spiritual 
influx belongs to those things which the mind produces outside 
of itself. Thus language is generated neither by chance nor 
by nature. To make this clear let us examine a text from 
Thomas Aquinas' commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics:
Tertio dicit, quod res acquirunt form m ex agentibus 
similibus: dicens, quod quaecumque substantia fit 'ex 
agente univoco,' idest simili secundum formam, Qmnes enim 
substantiae, quae generantur, generantur aut a natura, 
aut ab arte, aut a fortuna, aut 'automato,' idest casu, 
idest per se vano, Differt autem ars a natura, quia ars 
est principium agendi in alio, natura autem est principium 
actionis et motus in eo in quo est. Manifestum est autem, 
quod ea quae generantur ab arte, fiunt ex sibi simili.
1, Raissa Maritain, Situation de la Poesie (Paris: DesclSe 
de Brouwer, 1938) pp. 35”36,
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Aedificator enim, per formam domus quam habet in mente,
facit domum quae est in materia.
Manifestly, language is generated by art, There are exceptions 
which might be raised as objections to Thomas' treatment of 
things produced outside the mind; for example, it could be 
said that certain words enter the language a fortuna. as in 
the case of mistaken meaning, which is ascribed to a word and 
which gains currency. Or, it may be objected that certain 
words come into being a natura. as in the case of onomatopoeic 
words. In both these examples, it is the aptness of the word 
to convey an idea rather than its manner of coming into being 
that allows it to enter the language. This aptness always 
depends on the projection of meaning into it ab arte. But 
while the poet necessarily ascribes meanings to words he usejg, 
his interest is in words as things, since they are for him 
the means of making a thing. For the scientist, on the other 
hand, there is a production of something in the mind; words 
are a means of conveying his thoughts. For the poet, words 
are (in a manner of speaking) the goal, which is making; for 
the philosopher, a means of conveying ideas.
The scientist, since he is concerned only with the 
speculative order, has as his intention knowledge for the sake 
of knowing. He is concerned with the truth itself, not With
1, Thomas Aquinas, In Metaphysicam Aristotelis Commentaria 
(Taurini: Marietti, 1925) p. 691.
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the means by which the truth is reached or communicated. For 
him, then, language is a system of signs. Words point the 
way towards concepts, concepts take the mind to things, but 
both are means to the en4, and are not known directly in 
themselves. In a work of scientific abstraction, then, the 
medium in which a treatise is presented is made up of 
speculative signs; these signs may be changed in position, 
even substituted for by other signs which are synonomous , 
but the same meaning is derived from the whole.
A poem, on the other hand, cannot have the position 
of its parts altered, or the whole will lose its inference, 
and the poem is destroyed. In scientific prose, as we said 
above, the words are used almost exclusively as signs, and a 
treatise can be paraphrased without injuring the substance of 
the treatise or altering the meaning of the original; if a 
poem is translated, however, there is a substantial change; 
the only way in which there can be a poem before and after 
translation is to create a new poem with its own poetic sense. 
Since this is true, the •parts* of the poem, the words, must 
be more than .purely speculative signs directing the mind 
toward truth* They must be things in themselves:
1. Strictly speaking, synonymous words are impossible. Where 
it is possible to substitute one word for another, it is 
because the word does not matter as much as that which,.it 
signifies* Such is the case in scientific treatises. In poetry 
synonyms are often used as diametrically opposed words*
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The birth of idea, and hence of intellectual life 
in us, seems bound up with the discovery of the value 
of meaning of a sign. An animal employs signs without 
perceiving the relationship of meaning. To perceive the 
relationship of meaning is to have an idea —  a spiritual 
sign. Nothing could be more suggestive in this connection 
than that kind of miracle which is the first awakening of 
intelligence in blind deaf-mutes,,.: essentially it depends 
upon the discovery of the relationship of the meaning of 
some gesture with regard to a desired object. The sign is 
the keystone of intellectual life,-*-
In a footnote, referring to the same problem, he adds:
For the very genesis, for the first stirring of the 
idea as distinct from images, the intervention of a 
sensible sign is necessary,,.it is necessary that the 
relationship of meaning should first be actively exercised 
in a gesture, a cry, in a sensory sign bound up with the 
desire to be expressed. Knowing this relationship of 
meaning (signification) will come later, and this will 
be to have the idea, even.if it is merely implicit, of 
that which is signified, ...Language properly so called 
(conventional sensory signs) develops out of this 
’language* of natural sensory signs,^
To sum up, then, both poet and philosopher make use 
of words, each for their own purpose, The poet to communicate 
concrete images, to 'make* poems for the sake of expressing 
beauty, the philosopher for transportation from sensible things 
to the Real Truth, To quote Maritain again, 'the creative 
idea expresses itself finally in matter, as the speculative 
intuition of the philosopher does in the concept or mental 
word. And in truth these are analogous: to perform the inner 
word in the mind, and the work of art in matter.'^
1, Jacques Maritain, Ransoming the Time (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1946) pp* 220-221,
2, loc.cit., n. 2.
3, Art and Poetry. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1946)
pp. 80-81,
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Language is always a substitute for discourse of 
one kind or another. This is true for poetry as well as for 
prose; for any notation, mathematical or musical; in fact, 
for any kind of specifically human language. Words which 
compose language, living or dead, spoken or written, are in 
turn substitutes for things. But there is an important 
difference between a word as it appears by itself and as it 
appears in context. This we have already,.suggested. It 
remains now to make these notions precise*
A few moments of reflection raises disconcerting 
paradoxes. First, if words are substitutes for things, then 
it seems that context depends solely on the arrangement (or 
possible arrangement) of the things they represent. Second, 
if we say that words have two meanings, namely, the meaning 
they have by themselves and the meaning they have in context, 
it seems that it becomes impossible to use language} because
to learn the first meaning is futile if it is obliterated in
the context wherein it receives its second meaning. These two 
paradoxes must be resolved if only to avoid the alternative 
to them, that is, to say that meaning is derived from the use
to which they may be put as purely practical signs.
Let us consider, then, the first paradox: Words
are substitutes for things, but it is necessary to §dd, in 
an indirect manner. Directly they signify concepts. The
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laws which govern the arrangement of concepts (which are 
studied in logic) are not the same as those which govern 
things. It is absurd, therefore, to suppose that any verbal 
arrangement will suffice to serve directly as a substitute 
for an arrangement of things. It is equally absurd to 
propose a grammatical arrangement as a substitute for a 
logical arrangement, for the grammarian considers the 
relations that exist among words as parts of speech. For 
these reasons it is necessary to rule out the claims of 
logisticians when they say that it is possible to dispense 
with logic and thinking by providing laws and rules that 
govern ideographic signs (which are things primarily rather.: 
than signs). But let us add this classification:
We have to consider three distinct realms* each 
having its own laws: the realm of concepts, the realm of 
words, and the realm of things. The office of the concept is 
to signify things, and the office of the word is to signify 
concepts. Now we might reasonably ask: How is it possible 
to correlate these three realms? To answer, let us consider 
respectively and by itself each of the three terms: concept, 
word and thing. By itself the concept is seen to be a formal 
sign, one whose essence is to signify. In so doing it does 
not reveal itself, but in a perfeqt fashion reveals or makes 
known something other than itself. By itself a word represents
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the concept. It is a material sign which, for this reason, 
does not perform a purely significative function. It appears 
in order to make something else known. By itself the thing 
neither appears, nor reveals. To appear it must be objectised, 
i.e., it must become an object of knowledge. It follows, then, 
a word by itself signifies directly not a thing, but an object, 
or the thing, not as thing, but the thing insofar as it is 
known. It is necessary now only to point out that if the 
object is not a thing, then words cannot be directly 
substituted for things. It is impossible, therefore, to 
effect an arrangement of words as though words were due 
substitutes for things. The arrangement of words depends, 
it also follows, on the arrangement of concepts,
This conclusion has important practical consequences. 
The first and foremost is that no formula for action can be 
derived from the techniques of word arrangements. No self- 
adjusting formula which attempts to establish a direct 
connection between words and action is possible unless 
thought intervenes, any more than it is possible to construct 
a poem by using nothing else than a rhyming dictionary.
To give the above remarks more precise philo­
sophical meaning —  there are two doctrines: first, th$ 
supposition of terms, and second, oration or discourse,
Both doctrines are universally applicable to poetry and
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prose. The doctrine of supposition enables us to under- 
stand how words are related to concepts and to things in 
every form of linguistic expression.
Let us distinguish, first of all, between 'material* 
and 'formal' supposition* The supposition or substitute 
value of a word considered materially merely takes it as . 
a thing. For example, in the sentence 'Philosophers are 
arrogant fools' there are four words. If we ignore the 
differences of meanings, size, spelling, position, and so 
forth, of each word, and think of each word simply as it 
appears, its supposition is material. It would answer,, 
the question 'what is this thing?’ by saying, 'a word'.
It is necessary to point out, however, that a 
word must be used in,a proposition before it has even a 
material supposition. Hence: 'Homo est vox'j The word 
'homo' receives its material supposition by being used 
in the sentence 'Homo est vox}, Any other word could be 
substituted for the word 'homo', but any word used 
would in every case stand for itself (pro seipso). But 
in so doing it is no longer simply a wordj it becomes a 
'term'. And, for this reason, the supposition refers 
not directly to the word itself but to its acceptance.
We ask then: 'How is this word used?' and answer: 'as 
a word and nothing more', It is quite evident, then,
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that to use a word as a word is to make it a term, a 
term being, of course, part of a proposition. Now we 
are ready to define material supposition as: acceptio 
termini pro seipso,^
Such use of a word has no signification^ its 
function is merely representative. The only knowledge 
gained of the word is that it is part (one of the 
material parts) of a proposition*
With *formal supposition*, on the contrary, 
a word assumes a significative as well as a represen­
tative function, for the word in this case stands in 
the place of a concept which in turn signifies a thing,
A twofold division of formal supposition can now be 
made: proper and improper. In a proper supposition 
something is signified either immediately or mediatelyf 
immediately when a word signifies something without 
first signifying something elsej mediately when it 
signifies something else first which in turn signifies 
its designate*
1. For an adequate exposition of division of supposition 
(suppositionis divisio) consult Joseph Gredt, O.S.B., 
Elementa Philosophiae Aiistotelico- Thomisticae, XFriebourg: 
Herder' and Company, 1937) I, pp* 42“44. As fop the term 
’supposition*, which translates the Latin *suppositio*, 
there is really no exact equivalent in English, Perhaps 
the English substitute value is sufficient to designate 
•acceptio termini pro aliquo, de quo verificatur iuxta 
exigentiam copulae,» ibid> p* 42,
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Proper supposition terminates a word with
reference to the thing it immediately signifies, while
improper supposition is nothing else than a metaphorical
termination, A further division of proper supposition
can be made into simple (or logical) and real (personal).
Simple or logical supposition is the acceptance of a
term for what it immediately signifies (i.e. a concept),
while real or personal supposition gives a word a
mediate signification. And finally, as with the division 
1
of concepts, each term, according to its supposition 
has two objects which it signifies: formal or immediate 
and material or mediate. To illustrate, let us consider 
the word 'man': it signifies immediately the human 
nature and mediately the individual subsumed under the 
species. Proper nouns offer no special problem, For 
example, 1 Peter1 signifies immediately what is signified 
mediately by a common noun ’man*, and ’man' mediately 
what is signified by the proper noun 'Peter’,
Now let us apply this doctrine to the distinction 
we alluded to at the beginning of this chapter between 
words used almost exclusively as signs and words used 
almost exclusively as objects. In strictly logical 
language (to the extent that this is possible) the
1. cf. supra p, 46,
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supposition of each word depends on the necessity,.implied 
in the copula-verbs that give the total discourse.meaning. 
Naturally we are dealing here with suppositions that 
are for the most part logical, but which nevertheless 
have an application even in the most poetic work. The 
supposition that a word receives in a poem while not 
derived from the necessity imposed by the copula is 
nevertheless, there, being imposed by the fiat of the 
arti st,
This brings us to our discussion of oration
or discourse, and more especially of discourse for
practical purposes, (oratio ordinativa), of which
Maritain says:
i, (a.) There are four kinds of practical discourse 
(oratio ordinativa): discourse that summons (oratio 
voca'tiva) by which we move another to attention: 
"Rabbi"} discourse that interrogates (oratio interro- 
gativa)« by means of which we move him to answer:
"Ubi habitas?"} discourse that commands(oratio 
imperative): "Venite et videte," by which we move 
an inferior to perform some act, and discourse that 
implores (oratio deprecativa): "Domine aperi nobis," 
by which we move a superior to perform an act (for 
we arc unable to move our superior as such except 
by the expression of pur desire). Discourse that 
expresses a wish (oratio optativa) may be reduced 
to oratio deprecativa.
' (b) Logic omits from its consideration not 
only those four kinds of discourse, but also all 
the nuances of expression which in everyday language 
are mixed with enunciative discourse itself.,,in order 
to make it signify not only what is, but also the 
. opinion of the subject in regard to what is. In 
language Logic considers purely and simply the
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expression of thought from the point of view of 
the true and the false... We make use of a great 
many forms of speech that express something other 
than the simple identity (in re) of a Pr. and a S., 
but that is because, in these cases, these forms 
of speech are themselves something other than a 
simple enunciation,
In these four kinds of practical discourse 
just described, it is quite evident that the purpose 
of language is not to convey ideas. It is directed 
to the accomplishment of some good. Prayer provides 
us with a good example; we say to God, 'Thou art good'. 
We are not informing God of something which He does not 
already know. Prayer, which is a type of discourse, 
does not assert an identity. Its purpose is not 
communication, but the sanctification of the one who 
prays.' So also in poetry; the purpose is not communi­
cation, but the good of the work to be done. A poem 
does not assert, then, an identity expressible in 
logical language,'
It becomes clear that if logic and poetry 
are confused, rhetoric, the purpose of which is to 
persuade (yet without using logical demonstrations), 
is apt to usurp the province of creation. The quarrel 
between art and prudence is one of the sad results of 
a confusion of art and rhetoric. The logic of language
1, An Introduction to Logic (New York; Sheed and Ward, 
1937) pp. 94-95.
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is distinct from its poetry, It is important that we 
keep these two functions separate. Rhetorical modes 
have no place in poetry, nor has mathematical language. 
The best example of the use of poetry in 
language is found in the Chinese language, which throws 
light on our forgotten mental processes, and thus 
furnishes a new chapter in the philosophy of language. 
Since poetry must appeal to the emotions with the charm 
of direct impressions, the language must be direct, the 
verbs concrete. But it must also deal with spiritual 
suggestions and obscure relations, Chinese does this 
by metaphor, the use of material images to suggest 
immaterial relations. Metaphor, the revealer of nature, 
is the very substance of poetry; contrary to the general 
belief that art and poetry deal only with the general and 
abstract, they deal with the concrete of nature. The 
Chinese written language has not only absorbed the poetic 
substance of nature and built with it a second world of 
metaphor, but has through its very pictorial visibility, 
been able to retain its original creative poetry wi,th far 
more vigour and vividness than any phonetic tongue, The 
etymology of the word is constantly visible. After 
thousands of years, the lines of metaphoric advance are 
still shown, and in many cases actively retained in the
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yeaning. Thus a word, instead of growing poorer and poorer 
as with us, grows richer and richer.
The development of the normal transitive sentence 
rests upon the fact that one action in nature promotes 
another; thus the agent and object are secretly verbs. The 
verbal undertone of each noun should be kept in mind when 
reading Chinese poetry, for it is this activity which gives 
the language its power. The more concretely and vividly 
the interaction of things is expressed, the better the 
poetry; the great strentth of our language lies in the 
splendid array of transitive verbs, and their recognition 
of nature as a vast storehouse of forces. It is for this 
reason that Shakespeare is considered one of the finest 
of English poets: his persistent use of hundreds of tran­
sitive verbs, with rarely an ’is1 or 'are*, give his work 
a vitality seldom equalled by poets in the English language.
The poet can never feel or see too much. His 
metaphors are only ways of overcoming the lifeless copula. 
The ability of poetry to surpass prose in beauty and 
picturesqueness is due in particular to the poet's selection 
from juxtaposition of those words whose overtones blend 
into a delicate and lucid harmony. All arts follow the 
same law: refined harmony lies in the delicate balance of 
overtones.
Let us take for example the Chinese line: 'The
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Page 61
sun rises in the east*:
0
7T
Here the wealth of composition in characters makes possible 
a choice of words in which a single dominant overtone 
colours every plane of meaning; that is perhaps the most 
conspicuous quality of Chinese poetry. The sun on one 
side, on the other the sign of the east, the sun entangled 
in the branches of a tree. And in the middle sign, the 
verb ’rise’, the sun is above the horizon, but beyond that 
the single upright line is like the growing trunk.
extraordinary ability to lend itself so completely to
poetic expression. In other languages, as we have pointed
out, the poet is handicapped by the weakness and turbidity
of a medium of expression which frequently proves a
hindrance to his art. In the words of Baudelaire:
Le Poete est semblable au prince des nu^es 
Qui hante la tempete et se rit de l’archei?;
Exile sur le sol au milieu des huees,
Ses ailes de geant l’empechent de marcher.
The Chinese language is almost unique in this
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APPENDIX (a)
An intellectual sense of mystery (ens mysterium) is 
indispensable in coth metaphysics and poetry.
The word •mystery' in its original meaning was 
religious and theological. No apology is required for the 
appropriation of the word by philosophers or by poets. Ens 
mysterium. like theobject of faith, is transcendental. The 
order reflected in the soul of the poet and made known by 
his poem is also transcendental, A brief history of the 
word and a few explanatory notes should make this clear.
The word 'mystery* itself has had a long and 
interesting history* The use made of it by the ancients, 
the Greeks and the Romans (mysterium) was principally 
religious. Generally it designated a secret service or 
rite that was performed in connection with the worship of 
a deity.^ This was the first meaning of the word. The 
idea of secrecy was closely associated with its meaning:
In addition to the public festivals, there were certain 
secret and mysterious rites performed in honour of 
particular deities. The most famous of these were the 
secret rites performed in honor of Demeter and her 
daughter Persephone at Eleusis, and known as the 
Eleusian Mysteries,^
In his De Natura Deorum-^  Cicero uses the word in 
practically the same sense. The notes of secrecy and sacred­
ness are retained:
Suscepit autem vita hominua consuetudoque communis ut 
beneficiis excellentis viros in caelum fama ac voluntate 
tollerent. Hinc Hercules hinc Castor et Pollux hinc 
Aesculapius hinc Lifeer etiam (hunc dico Liberum Semela 
natum, non eum quem nostri maiores auguste sancteque 
(Liberum) cum Cerere et Libera consecraverunt, quod 
quale sit ex mysteriis intellegi potest...
Another meaning in the Latin form of the word is 
seen among the Christians. With them it designates principally 
something transcending mere human intelligence. The Vulgate
1. The Oxford English Dictionary (Clarendon Press, 1933),
Vol. VI, p. 815 bff.
2. C. E, Smith and P. G. Moorhead, A Short History of the Ancient 
World (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 'inc., 1939)pp. 1A3_144.
3. Cicero, De Natura Deorum (H. Rackham) (London: William Heinemann, 
1933) II, xxiv, 62, p. 182.
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speaks of the mysterium^ evyigelii. mysteria regni caelorum. 
and mysterium iniquitatis, These excellent examples indicate 
the changed meaning of the word with the Christians, The 
emphasis has shifted from 'secrecy1 to 'transcendence', or at 
least to transcendence with regard to the human intelligence.
In these three examples the intellectual content of faith 
(fides) in the Pauline sense iB indicated. But now the note 
of 'vision' is added. Saint Paul defined faith as ' Thd substance 
of things hoped for, a certification of things not seen.1 In 
the Vulgate this appears as follows:
Est autem fides sperandarum substantia rerum, argu­
ment urn non apparentium.2
Faith is a cognitive virtue, an intellectual habitus 
which perfects the mind in its knowledge of resealed truth.
Assent is given to a proposition without its being proved.
This explains the second part of the definition, 'a certification 
of things not seen*. Here we have the elements necessary for 
mystery: in one sense the mysterium fidei is grasped by the
intellect and in another it is not. The clear-obscure vision^ 
of things unseen implies no contradiction because 'things not 
seen' are not seen by the light of human reason (or philo­
sophically) but by the highest light, viz., the authority of 
God revealing.
The mysterium fidei thus contains the notes of 
'sacredness', 'transcendence' and 'vision'. The last note, 
perhaps needs some explanation. The object of faith according 
to Saint Paul and Thomas Aquinas, is not something demonstrable, 
that is, a knowledge which can be reduced to first principles 
which are self-evident.^- Nevertheless the light of faith 
(lumen fidei) causes those things which are believed to be 
seen: Dicendum quod lumen fidei facit videre ea quae
creduntur.5
1. Eph. 6-19; Matt. 13-11; 2 Thess. 2-7.
2. Bibliorum Sacrorum iuxta vulgatam clementinam (Typis Poly­
glottis Vaticanis, Mediolanensis, 1913.) p. 1122.
3. vide Garrigou-Lagrange, Le sens du mystere et le clair-obscur 
intellectuel (Paris: Desilee de Brouwer, 1934) p p . 134-156.
4. Thomas Aquinas, SumlTheol. (Ottawa Edition, Ottawa, Canada, 
1941) II-II, 1.4.c.
5. loc.cit. ad 3.
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1?o believe does not involve a reduction to first principles 
but an election on the part of the will moved by thevsuper­
natural lumen fidei to assent intellectually to a given 
proposition, e.g., Christ and the mystical body of the 
Church are one#
A third meaning might be called 1 sacramental1, where 
for instance mysterium fidei designates the Lord's Supper.^ -
* * * * * * $ $ $
Now let us see what notes are involved in ens 
mysterium. the object of metaphysics; here we are dealing 
with a natural lumen, the light of the human intellect#
The first point to be considered here is that the human 
intellect is finite. Its power to grasp its natural 
object (which is being) is, therefore, limited, being 
dependent on what it has received as a created essence#
The second point is that it confronts three orders: one 
which is above it, the superior order; a- second order which 
is bdlow it, the inferior order; and a third which is 
connatural with it. Hence, we have the human intellect con­
sidering divine things, things that pertain to God, that 
are at once 'sacred1 and *transcendent*• Me have also the 
human intellect considering nature in the particular sciences. 
And finally we have man considering himself and those objects 
connatural to him#
Denial of mystery involves a confusion of orders:
1# A confusion of the superior with the connatural or 
2# A confusion of the inferior with the connatural. A 
third confusion is possible, the inferior with the superior. 
As Garrigou-Lagrange points out, there are two fundamental 
errors that eliminate mystery from metaphysics, namely, 
spiritualism and materialism. ^ Into these two categories 
most of the moderns can be classified# The prime example 
of spiritualism is Deseartes, who explained the inferior 
in terms of the superior.*
1. vide A New Latin Dictionary. Louis and Short, American 
Book Co., New York: 190?) pp. 1183, c.
2# Garrigou-Lagrange, op. cit.. p. 134 n5.
3* ibid.. p. 106.
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M Maritain* s statement on the nature of mystery in 
Sept Lemons sur 1'Etre provides us with a full explanation 
on how the term is used in metaphysics:
Suivant une terminologie que j* emprunte k un 
philosophe franqais cdntemporain, M Gabriel Marcel,—  
mais que j*applique, It vrai dire, d'une faqon tout k 
fait diffirente,—  disons que toute question posde 
par une science prdsente un double aspect. L*aspect 
mystere. et 1*aspect problVme* G*est un mystbre et 
c'est un problbme; un 'mystbre* du cot6 de la chose, 
de l'objet et de sa rdality extramentale; un 'problbme' 
du cotd de nos formules.
La notion de mystbre intelligible n*est pas une 
notion contradictoire, c'est la plus exacte faqon de 
designer la realite; le mystbre n'est pas 1'ennemi, 
1'adversaire de 1'intelligence, c'est Descartes et la 
raison cartesienne qui ont introduit eette opposition 
menteuse,—  opposition du rest inevitable en systbme 
idealists, en climat iddaliste. L*objectivity de 
1* intelligence est elle-mbme souverainement nysterieuse; 
et l'objet de la connaissance, c'est le 'mystbre' amend 
& l'dtat d'intelligibility en acte et d'intellection en 
acte: elle devient 1*autre en tant qu*autrej elle amene 
au sein d'elle-ineme une realitd indpuisable ("trans- 
objective") vitalement saisi comme objet. L'objet^ 
c'est le rdel lui-meme.*
The sacramental meaning of mystery is in no sense sacrificed 
in this explanation by M Maritain* The sacramental character 
of the universi is indispensable in a metaphysics whieh claims 
to be true*
1* Jacques Maritain, Sept Lecons sur L'Etre (Paris: Chez Pierre 
Tdqui, 1933) pp. 8-9*
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